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ABSTRACT 
This paper provides an overview of the attitudes towards the Sahrawi people and the 
POLISARIO Front in Algeria and Morocco, with a more specific focus on how these latter have 
impacted their endeavour to establish the former’s own sovereign state. The paper provides 
background on the political, social, and economic, atmospheres in both countries, to 
contextualise the modern state of democratic institutions and voter engagement. With this 
information in mind, several potential pathways forward are presented for Sahrawi self-
determination, weighing the pros and cons of seeking political representation within existing 
states, or through secession.  
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BACKGROUND 
Western Sahara is a territory over which sovereignty has been greatly debated since the end of 
the colonial period.  Previously a Spanish colony (1884–1975; after 1958, overseas province of 
Spanish Sahara), the land was primarily occupied by the Sahrawi and Berber people.  The Frente 
Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro, or the POLISARIO Front, was a 
Sahrawi rebel group formed in 1973 to fight against Spanish occupation and later Moroccan 
occupation1. Shortly after Morocco gained independence from France in 1956, King Hassan II 
organised a march of Moroccans into Western Sahara to claim it as part of Morocco.  At the 
time, Spain was also formally pulling out of most of its colonies and negotiated the land to 
Morocco.  The Sahrawi people had been seeking to establish their own state within the borders 
of Western Sahara, and felt the negotiation between Spain and Morocco undermined their right 
to self–determination and sovereignty2.  
Since the Moroccan occupation of the territory began in 1975, there have been armed 
conflicts and ongoing debates in the World Court and United Nations in an attempt to reach a 
mutually beneficial settlement for both groups3.  Currently, the POLISARIO Front has declared 
itself a state and runs a semi-socialist democratic government in a refugee settlement across the 
border in Algeria4; the UN considers the area a “non–self–governing territory” administered by 
Morocco as a administrative but colonial power.  Under Baker Plan I (2000), Western Sahara 
would function as a semi-autonomous region for Sahrawi people; the region could foster no 
national defense or foreign policy.  This plan was proposed and accepted by Morocco; however, 
                                               
1 Seddon, 1989 
2 Hodges, 1984 
3 Seddon, 1996 
4 Farah, 2009 
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it was not formally moved for review by the UN Security Council.  Baker Plan II proposed to 
grant Western Sahara semi-autonomous designation for five years followed by referendum for 
independence to be voted upon by all Sahrawi citizens.  This plan was proposed and endorsed by 
the UN Security Council in July 2003, and accepted by the Sahrawi but not the Moroccans. 
Sahrawi people in Morocco as late as 2005 took part in demonstrations and protests5 demanding 
statehood, but despite the efforts of the 1991 Settlement Plan, and the 2003 Baker Plan, 
consensus has yet to be reached. While the Moroccan monarchy outright denies Sahrawi claims 
to Western Sahara, Algeria has given the POLISARIO Front its ongoing support since 19756, a 
policy that has strained Algerian-Moroccan relations7. 
The struggle for self-determination in increasingly small nation-states is not unique to the 
Sahrawi people. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, the Palestinians and Kurds 
have engaged in ongoing political and armed conflicts seeking sovereignty; in Spain, Catalonians 
and Basques seek to secede from the Spanish state; and throughout Eastern Europe, there have 
been numerous conflicts since the fall of the USSR on 26 December 1991.  However, granting 
Sahrawi people a state in Western Sahara may not be a sustainable political goal because the 
MENA region is so ethnically diverse that there could ensue endless conflicts over which groups 
should have sovereign states8.  Rather, the Sahrawi people may be better served by seeking 
political representation in either Morocco, Algeria, or both.  Both Morocco and Algeria are 
illiberal democracies where seeking citizenship and representation in parliament may not 
immediately lead to greater freedoms.  In Algeria, the Sahrawi have the benefit of being seen as 
                                               
5 Kaye, et al., 2008 
6 The Monroe News-Star, 1976 
7 Williams, 1914 
8 Wellman, 2005 
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politically legitimate insofar as being members of their own independent state.  However they 
likely would not be welcomed into the Algerian political theatre because in so doing, they would 
pose a threat to the pan-Arab national identity.  For the Sahrawi to gain access to the political 
theatre in Morocco, they would have to abandon the search for statehood to which the 
POLISARIO Front still adamantly adheres.  In Morocco, the Sahrawi could potentially ride the 
wave of momentum gained by the Berber movements and gain recognition—if they are not 
perceived as posing a threat to the Moroccan monarchical hegemony. 
MOROCCO - BACKGROUND 
Morocco is a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral legislature.  Within both houses there is 
such a high level of representation that power remains highly decentralised, and even parties 
with a majority share struggle to pass legislation.  The Moroccan constitution was not adopted 
until 1962, and it specifically outlines a multiparty system with checks in place to limit 
democratic institutions from being established and maintain the primacy of the monarchy.  The 
king is the commander in chief of the military, maintains the power to dissolve parliament, 
appoints all ambassadors, and is the supreme religious authority in the state.  The system is not 
without its benefits, but it also is illiberal and viewed as undemocratic by much of the Moroccan 
general populace.  The newspaper The Telegraph estimated in 2005 that the monarchy costs 
Moroccan taxpayers roughly an estimated £144 million a year (US$271M at the then current 
exchange rate), which—given it is 18 times the budget of Queen Elizabeth II or almost 30 times 
that of King Juan Carlos II of Spain—is not sustainable in any economic or political model. 
In the post-colonial period, King Hassan II was able to gain private control over much the 
of land previously held by French and Spanish colonial powers and allot it to those he deemed 
loyal to the royal family.  This inner circle was constantly rotating, thereby creating factions 
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amongst the elite; neither the lower nor upper classes are intended—or indeed, even able—to 
unify against the monarchy.  Evidence shows that the monarchy and political leadership are 
unable or unwilling to address growing socio-economic issues.  Human rights associations, 
women’s solidarity groups, local civil society groups, and moderate Islamist groups, all are 
trying to provide support for their target demographics.  There is particular discontent among the 
youth, who are growing increasingly discontented with the state’s inability to address pressing 
social and economic issues.  The objective of the aid group to elevate their niche demographics 
appears to be targeted with the express goal of keeping people from more radical ideologies. 
Discontent Moroccans do, according to various articles of the Moroccan constitution, 
have the right to strike (Art. 29), the right to vote and run in elections (Art. 11, 30), as well as 
freedom of opinion, expression, public gathering, and association (Art 10), and belonging to a 
union (Art. 8).  Strong democratic institutions require participation; however, voluntary 
participation is dependent on institutions being demonstrably functional.  In Morocco under King 
Hassan II, elections were rigged in order to maintain the status quo.  Since the 1990’s Morocco 
has gradually opened itself to greater democratisation, and held elections closer to the realm of 
“free and fair” expected of a liberal democracy.  But the common people of Morocco have yet to 
experience any positive side effects of the liberalisation. There has been an increase in 
representation and guaranteed positions for women in politics and religious affairs.  But in day to 
day life, there has been little increase in the state of social and economic inequality.  Abstention 
from elections has become a growing form of protest. 
The 2011 election saw the rise of the Parti de la Justice et du Développement (PJD: 
22.8% of the 4.7M votes, 27.1% of the 395 seats); the PJD followed in the footsteps of the 
1960’s Mouvement Populaire (MPDC).  A moderate right–wing Islamist party, the PJD chose to 
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support the Moroccan monarchy while demanding reform and greater democratic institutions, 
and economic partnerships with other countries.  The popularity of the PJD and other moderate 
Islamist groups in Morocco is dependent on their ability to deliver on their promises of creating 
positive social and economic change for the citizens of Morocco.  Within the confines of the 
political system as it exists today, it is very unlikely that they will achieve their goals, and 
instead they will gradually lose credibility.  The Moroccan royal family maintains tight control 
over all state affairs and makes it nearly impossible for reformist parties to liberalise institutions 
at a rate fast enough to appease voters.  Notwithstanding, in the most recent (2016) elections, 
PJD improved by 18 points to 27.9% of the vote and 31.6 (125) of the seats.  In counter however, 
a monarchy–backed party (Authenticity and Modernity Party, PAM), increased its representation 
by 55% to 20.95% of the votes and 25.8% (102) of the seats.  This vast increase by a 
monarchical party will only make reform more difficult. 
There are many respected associations working as civil society actors that citizens can 
look to for support and organisation where the state does not deliver.  For instance, women’s 
associations began formally coalescing in the 1980s, though the women’s rights movement has a 
history in Morocco pre-revolution; the associations have made significant headway in achieving 
their goals.  Moroccan family code was written so that women and men were broadly considered 
equals, and this led to an expansion of personal, private, and economic rights among women. 
Morocco, like many North African states, has a significant Berber population: the 
Moroccan people consider themselves 99% Arab-Berber.  Several Berber associations banded 
together to create the Amazigh Movement.  Amazigh is the name of the indigenous cultural 
group of Morocco, and Imazighen means “free/noble people”.  This movement sought to bring 
recognition to the Amazigh Moroccans, and to end repression of Tamazight language and 
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culture, which is defined in Article 5 of the 2011 constitution as one of the two official languages 
of Morocco.  The Amazigh movement was successful in many ways.  Tamazight language study 
is now required in schools, and the news is broadcast in Tamazight as well as Moroccan Arabic.  
This was done to co-opt the Amazigh movement and avoid radicalisation of dissatisfied citizens 
later.  However, these gains by the Imazighen have been met with mixed reviews by the many 
Moroccans who do not identify with Amazigh culture. 
One of Morocco’s greatest ongoing disputes in the international political arena is the 
disputed sovereignty over Western Sahara.  Western Sahara, as described above, is a former 
Spanish colony that was claimed by the Moroccan monarchy at the end of the colonial period.  
The Sahrawi people claim, with significant historical evidence, that Western Sahara is their 
ancestral homeland and that they should be granted to right to self–determination within its 
borders.  Credible linguistic evidence points to the Saharawi being Saharan Arabs, as Hassaniya 
is a Bedouin Arabic dialect.  Spain failed to involve itself in this regional conflict and turned the 
land over to Morocco and Algeria, but the Sahrawi still dispute this claim, with backing from the 
United Nations.  Many Sahrawi people now live in Algeria in refugee settlements just beyond the 
border.  This has strained Moroccan-Algerian relations, in addition to strict travel and visa laws 
between the countries.  Morocco also still has contentious relations with Spain regarding disputes 
over land in Morocco (the territory/cities of Ceuta and Melilla) still being held by the Spanish 
state. 
SAHRAWI PEOPLE IN MOROCCO 
Mineral rights and tourism revenue of Western Sahara are potential factors in why Morocco 
would be hesitant to cede the territory.  However, revenues derived from these financial sectors 
are not so great that they could argue that the economy would be irreparably impacted by the 
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loss.  This potential for capital loss is a key factor in why Morocco seeks to stake a historical 
claim to the area.  In contrast, the Sahrawi claim to the land is based on the contemporary loss of 
the land on which they had lived.  The Sahrawi were a historically nomadic people who 
primarily lived in Western Sahara but also could claim areas of southern Morocco, Southwestern 
Algeria, and most of northern Mauritania. The borders of Morocco as drawn up in the Treaty of 
Fez signed in 1912 pose a dilemma already because the tribal groups in the region were 
historically nomadic, and to some extent remain so to this day. While the Sahrawi people could 
claim Western Sahara, there would still be groups with legitimate claims to overlapping areas in 
other states. 
Were the Sahrawi people to agree to being designated an autonomous region within 
Morocco, they would still forfeit a certain level of governance to Morocco as a result of the 
parliamentary structure.  This could potentially be problematic as the government of the Sahrawi 
Arab Democratic Republic is a single party socialist government that is incompatible with a 
monarchical system and the Moroccan constitution if 2011.  Catalonia in Spain is often cited as a 
reason that autonomous statehood could be a viable option for Western Sahara.  However, there 
is a constant unrest in the region as conflicts continue to arise between the central and 
autonomous governments. 
Representation within Morocco could be a workable option for Sahrawi seeking political 
determination.  The Moroccan monarchy has been gradually liberalising and democratising.  
Progress is slow, but there have been serious victories made by associations9 such as the 
Moroccan Women’s Associations.  This association was able to effect change to Moroccan 
family code that allowed unmarried women to be considered adult and gave them greater rights, 
                                               
9 Lust, 2011 
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and the Berber movements in the state have gained greater recognition as a result of their 
activism. The Sahrawi people could seek self-determination by broadening the rights and 
recognition of Berber groups in Morocco to include themselves, as the POLISARIO Front has 
already been engaged in internal political struggles following similar patterns10. 
ALGERIA - BACKGROUND 
Algeria is, as of July 2018, a country of approximately 41,657,488 people, 99% of which are 
Arab-Berber; the CIA World Factbook notes that while most Algerians have Berber ancestry, 
only 15% of Algerians self–identify as Berber. Arabic is the official language of Algeria; 
however, many of the middle and upper class also speak French.  Tamazight, or Berber, is an 
officially recognised language of Algeria; dialects spoken within Algeria include Kabyle 
(Taqbaylit), Shawiya (Tacawit), Mzab Berber, and Tuareg Berber (Tamahaq). On paper, Algeria 
is a majority Arab state wherein the people speak Arabic leading to a pan-Arab national identity.  
The reality on the ground is that the majority of the citizens who identify as Arab live in 
the north of the country, in densely populated cities, while most of those who identify as Berber 
live across the south.  There are social and historical reasons for this development of split 
identities.  The north of Algeria was historically part of the Roman and Ottoman Empires, and in 
the modern era was developed during the French colonial period because the French could 
benefit economically from building up urban areas for exporting goods and importing tourists.  
In the contemporary era, it remains significantly more developed than the south.  The southern 
regions of Algeria remained relatively autonomous until Algeria became an independent state: 
trying to coalesce a single national identity and representative democracy has continued to be 
problematic. 
                                               
10 Lippert, 1992 
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Contemporary state formation began in Algeria with the Front de Libération Nationale 
(FLN, “national liberation front”), and its armed wing, Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN, 
“army of national liberation”). The FLN was established in 1954 and eventually gained the 
support and membership of almost all Algerian nationalists. What started as a guerilla resistance 
to end French occupation of Algerian territory remains a powerful political player in Algeria to 
this day: in the 2017 legislative elections, they garnered a majority of the vote, 26%, gaining 164 
of the available 462 seats (35.5%); despite the numbers, however, this represented a loss of 44 
seats relative to the 2012 legislative elections.  The FLN were initially tasked with untangling the 
wreckage left in the aftermath of the French colonial period.  France had not extended its 
educational or healthcare systems to Algeria, not had it developed or industrialised the country 
beyond what was necessary for extracting goods.  This lack of material, economic, and social, 
infrastructure was not stable ground on which to found a new state.  Thus, after the revolution, 
government policies focused on urbanisation, and growing the small business and education 
sectors.  The methods of urbanisation and development increased the quality of life in fits and 
spurts but decimated the rural population, as well as leading to high unemployment in urban 
areas. 
Ahmed Ben Bella (1916–2012) was the first president of an independent Algeria (15 
September 1963 – 19 June 1965).  He centralised power in Algeria, helped found the state’s early 
institutions, and codify the constitution.  However, in June of 1965 Colonel Houari Boumédiène 
(1932–1978) overthrew Ben Bella.  While both Ben Bella and Boumédiène were—or at least 
openly proclaimed—to be socialists, Ben Bella’s economic plan had been to gradually 
industrialise and socialise while still maintaining global trade.  Boumédiène in contrast cut 
Algeria off from the West and immediately nationalised the major industries.  He also further 
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disrupted the existing rural and agrarian societies that had already been impacted by the late 
Ottoman and French imposition of private land ownership by instigating a land grab purposefully 
limiting landed property and redistributing land to the lower classes with the intention of forming 
cooperatives.  Islamism became more popular as socioeconomic inequality ran rampant. 
Throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s, Algeria remained by and large politically stable, and 
the state benefited from the income generated by the nationalisation of the hydrocarbons 
industry.  In 1978 however, the death of Boumédiène left the country going through a series of 
failed power transitions and coups.  As the army fought against political leaders for control of the 
government, the economy suffered from isolation, liberalisation, fluctuating global markets, and 
austerity. 
In the 1990’s, Algeria opened its market to liberalisation and its political system to multi–
party elections.  What followed is an unstable period known as the “red decade” from 1992-
2002, where the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) and political opposition groups were in constant 
conflict with the military establishment government.  The FIS won 54.2% of the votes in the 
1990 local elections (to 28.1 for the FLN).  However, when the FIS won 180 seats in parliament 
in the 1992 parliamentary elections, the army pressured then president Chadli Bendjedid (in 
office 9 February 1979 to 11 January 1992) to cancel the elections.  When Bendjedid tried to 
compromise with the FIS, the army had him removed and replaced him first with an acting 
president, Abdelmalek Benhabyles (from 11 to 14 January 1992), then with Mohamed Boudiaf, 
one of the founders of the FLN, who was assassinated on 29 June 1992 by a bodyguard.  
Although the assassin was said to have acted on Islamist sympathies, many still believe to this 
day that the real reason behind the assassination lay in Boudiaf’s challenge of the army’s 
governmental control.  Two more elected officials were removed before the longest running 
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president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, was elected in 1999 (through 2 April 2019).  Bouteflika 
maintained his office by not challenging military authority, but this accommodation has led to 
continually weakening institutions and ongoing political unrest.  While Algeria is a democracy, 
with multi–party national elections, it is not a liberal democracy, thus socially devolving into 
ongoing conflict between the military controlled majority and the minority groups seeking 
representation.  Despite the dissolution and banning of the FIS, political Islam plays an important 
role in contemporary Algerian civil and civic life.  Due to the widespread unpopularity of radical 
Islamism stemming from violence in the 1980’s and 1990’s, Islamism in Algeria today call only 
for a gradual shift to becoming an Islamic state.  
Flaws remain in the sociopolitical system.  For instance, laws to not protect the status of 
women; however women continue hold positions in government, universities, and hospitals. 
While custom dictates general societal modesty, women are not forced to be veiled and in fact, 
Algeria recently banned women from veiling their face at work with either burqas or niqabs. 
Algeria does not reserve seats for women in parliament, and even without reserved seating, 
women hold about one quarter of the seats across both houses.  
Despite the standing illiberal government, the Algerian people have formed many unions 
and coalitions that, while not recognised by the government, have fought for workers’ rights and 
democracy.  The government engages in promoting covert operations, harassment, and unlawful 
arrests, in order to quell this social and political unrest. This balance of civil versus civic plays 
out on all levels in Algeria. While technically a presidential republic with a bicameral parliament 
and high representation, the state remains illiberal as ⅓ of the seats in the upper house are 
appointment by the president with the intention of maintaining the army’s control over policy. 
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THE SAHRAWI IN ALGERIA 
At present, Moroccan parliamentary structure would potentially make it impossible for the 
Sahrawi people to have any political power even if they agreed to become a region of Morocco 
and take part in the Moroccan state.  In contrast, the Sahrawi refugees in Algeria could seek 
citizenship and representation in Algeria, where the semi-presidential republic would potentially 
offer them more political freedom. 
Like Morocco, Algeria, as described above, could be considered an illiberal democracy. 
Despite the illiberal government, much like in Morocco, the Algerian people have formed many 
unions and coalitions that, while not recognised by the government, have fought for workers’ 
rights and democracy11, and the government engages in covert operations, harassment, and 
unlawful arrests.  Ultimately however, the government is primarily controlled by the army.  The 
Sahrawi would therefore face two hurdles in order to gain representation: first, the Army very 
much espouses a Nasserist pan-Arab national identity; second, even if allowed to participate in 
elections, they could never gain a majority in parliament and would struggle to pass any 
legislation meaningful to their benefit12.  By forcing a pan-Arab identity, the government seeks 
to downplay Berber culture and history within its borders; the Sahrawi people in contrast, while 
having both Berber and Arab ancestry, still consider themselves very much a Berber minority.  
They would accordingly have to downplay this aspect of their identity in order to be allowed to 
function within the framework of Algerian politics. 
 
ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS REPLACING LEFTIST REVOLUTION 
                                               
11 Lust, 2011 
12 Keenan, 2006 
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The POLISARIO Front is a leftist revolutionary party as is, in theory, the FLN of Algeria.  
However, leftist revolutionary parties represent a growing minority in the MENA region as 
Islamist parties have become increasingly popular and gained majority control in elections. 
Islamist parties themselves represent a broad spectrum of the political spectrum: from highly 
conservative to highly liberal13.  This can put the POLISARIO Front at a disadvantage while 
looking they seek allies in the region.  Monarchies such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia would not 
want to potentially place their rule in danger by supporting a leftist revolutionary party.  
Conservative Islamist parties similarly would not want to support the secularist POLISARIO 
Front.  In both Morocco and Algeria, this set of circumstances would hence not be to the benefit 
of the POLISARIO Front.  While the Algerian army publicly espouses secular policy and seeks 
to promote secular allies, the army’s support of pan-Arab ideology would likely make the 
POLISARIO Front ineligible for support within the Algerian political sphere.  The parties that 
make up the current opposition in the Algerian legislature are the Green Algeria Alliance, a 
coalition of Islamist parties who as a result also would be unlikely to support the POLISARIO 
Front in Algerian politics.  In Morocco, the reformist Islamist parties and the left leaning parties 
would be more likely to go into coalition with the POLISARIO Front were they able to gain any 
seats in parliamentary elections.  However, gaining official recognition and being allowed by the 
King to run in elections is highly unlikely. 
SELF-DETERMINATION OR SOVEREIGNTY 
Ultimately in an increasingly global world where exchange across borders is on the rise, even in 
previously homogenous states, voluntary diaspora is a given.  It is not sustainable to create 
increasingly smaller ethno-states in order to appease ethnic conflicts when citizens of those 
                                               
13 Berger, 2019 
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conflicting states will still inevitably come into contact with one another.  A two–state solution in 
cases such as Palestine and Israel would force the 1 in 10 interfaith couples14 in the resulting 
apartheid country to choose one faith and one state despite having a claim to both identities.  
Similarly, forcing borders into an already heavily settled Western Sahara will result in more 
harm than good. 
Prior to World War I, there was little benefit to independent statehood beyond self–
determination.  The Interwar Period brought Wilsonian self–determination informed by 
international policy, and there was a sharp increase in the number of states worldwide.  This 
period saw the beginning some of the first international organisations, such as the precursor to 
the United Nations: the League of Nations, that offered benefits to member states, a reason a 
group might want to seek independent statehood15.  The nationalist thesis typical of this period 
even goes so far as to claim that governance of ethnically homogeneous states is more likely to 
maintain stability and legitimacy16.  Ethnic groups in conflict currently are viewed in the 
international community as a high security dilemma, with the only way to solve the dilemma 
from a realist perspective being separation17; however, apartheid states and forced migration are 
demonstrably ineffective long–term solutions. We have seen countless examples in the MENA 
region and around the world that partition, even as a short term solution, leads to destabilisation 
from which it can be difficult to recover18. 
We can look at the struggle for Saharawi independence as having three likely outcomes 
based on Kaufman’s suggested solutions for ethnic conflicts the constructivist approach of 
                                               
14 Maltz, 2014 
15 Fazal & Griffiths, 2014 
16 Wellman, 2005 
17 Kaufman, 1996 
18 Dubnov & Robson, 2019 
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creating a single overarching identity that overrides the warring micro–identities; reintegration; 
and/or power–sharing based on including the minority in the democratic process.  In the case of 
Sahrawi self-determination, there is a strong case to be made for statehood.  The two moral 
arguments for statehood are first, that the secession should not economically or socially destroy 
the mother state; and second, that the people should be demonstrably more successful in the 
event of secession.  Both arguments can be shown to be proven in the case of the Sahrawi 
people. However, the Moroccan crown is not likely for the time being to completely cede the 
territory of Western Sahara, and conversely, the POLISARIO Front is not likely to agree to 
power sharing as a semi-autonomous region.  Should the Sahrawi be granted semi-autonomous 
statehood, it would still likely lead to exploitation due to the fact that parties and interest groups 
who attempt take actions contrary to the crown find themselves banned from the political sphere.  
In a similar vein, the region currently occupied by Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria would 
never be ceded by the FLN, and political opposition to the shadow military leadership of Algeria 
often has led to the assassination of political leaders in the past. 
Even in the event that a state successfully secedes, there can be no guarantee of border 
safety in the event that a nation secedes from its mother state and seeks self-determination within 
its own new borders, as illustrated by ongoing ethnic conflicts in the Balkans.  If two groups 
experiences conflict within one state and the international community responds by creating a 
forced separation of those groups, these latter will not suddenly agree to cross–border friendship. 
The resentment will remain: however, there now will be even less of an incentive to coexist, as 
evinced by ongoing violence along the India/Pakistan border.  Fostering contemporary identities 
beyond sectarian conflicts is essential in ending these conflicts.  It is not an easy or simple 
solution, but it is the most viable in the long–term.  
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Jordan for instance, has maintained political and economic stability in the MENA region.  
It has done so historically first, by including the existing Bedouin minority into the political 
system; and second, by integrating migrants.  Jordan has subsequently fostered a multi-ethnic 
Jordanian national identity welcoming to many minority groups.  This permissiveness has 
allowed the state to maintain a social equilibrium with a growing population of refugees from 
differing national, religious, and ethnic groups.  In addition to the foregoing, Jordan has focused 
on economic development and social safety nets, which result in an ameliorated well–being for 
the populace.  Jordan managed this despite being surrounded by unstable and failed states.  As 
such, Jordan could exemplify a model for mitigating the rise of secessionist movements.  Except 
in extreme cases of violence and oppression, the international community would be better served 
by strengthening democratic institutions that allow groups to seek self-determination within the 
existing state.  
CONCLUSION 
The international community cannot remain focused on the separation of ethnic groups, even if 
they view it as being for their own protection.  The belief that nations of individuals in similar 
cultural, ethnic, religious, and other factional groups, should form independent states together is 
well–intentioned but harmful at best, and the result of colonialism and white supremacy at worst. 
In “Seven Regions Scheme,” Sir Reginald Coupland, the man behind many of the British 
Empire’s partition plans, stated that ideally, India would have been partitioned into many small 
historically informed princely states that functioned as one federation still under British 
dominion.  Copeland felt that the states constituting India had not reached the degree of maturity 
necessary to coexist and instead, that the partition was a temporary status that would eventually 
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cease to be necessary.  His successful example of the reintegration of warring states? Scotland, 
Ireland, and England. In the 1990’s he would find himself disproven.19  
Rather than focusing on partitions, semi-autonomous regions, or sharing of power, 
greater efforts must be placed into strengthening democratic institutions such that minorities 
have access and can make use of them.  “The health of a democracy depends not only on support 
for key political values such as civil rights, but also on the active participation of an informed 
citizenry.”20  For a democracy to succeed, all citizens must have access to democratic 
institutions, and more than that: they must actively engage with them.  This can be problematic 
because due to systematic inequality in the formation of all modern states, many disenfranchised 
groups never have had access to institutions; and, if they do gain access, they are often wary of 
the state’s intentions.  
Seeking to be part of the state’s definition of a person, to gain access to democratic 
institutions, and to get what a person or group feels they are due or need from those institutions 
is time consuming.  For many, especially in younger generations, it seems more viable not to 
expect anything from the state, but instead to organise locally and provide for themselves within 
their own shared identity groups.  With respect to the case of Sahrawi self-determination, it is 
difficult to see a path forward given the state of democracy in both Algeria and Morocco.  In 
both cases, efforts would need to be made to strengthen the legitimacy of democratic institutions.  
Political reform in Morocco by moderate and reformist parties, in union with non-governmental 
entities, provides the most viable opportunity for future inclusion of the POLISARIO Front in 
politics, and for some level of reintegration and self-determination for the Sahrawi people. 
                                               
19 Dubnov & Robson, 2019 
20 Foa & Mounk, 2016 
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